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DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK LAW
Although failure to ensure that defendant is aware of risks inher-
ent in joint representation is error, withdrawal of guilty plea is
permitted only if defendant demonstrates significant possibility
of conflict of interest
Because of the potential for confficts of interest, a criminal de-
fendant's sixth amendment right to effective assistance of coun-
sel15 may be violated when his attorney also represents a code-
Florida Bar v. Schreiber, 407 So.2d 595, 598-600 (Fla. 1981) and Allison v. Louisiana State
Bar Ass'n, 362 So. 2d 489, 496 (La. 1978). Because of this kind of confusion, it is hoped that
the Supreme Court will soon devise clear standards which will allow direct or indirect solici-
tation and prevent potential abuse. Note, supra note 119, at 774. For a discussion of various
proposals which, without absolute prohibition, purport to protect the public from the poten-
tial harms of in-person solicitation, see id. at 775-77.
I" The sixth amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. This provision has been held to guarantee to criminal defendants the right to
effective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942). In
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970), the Supreme Court enunciated a stan-
dard for measuring whether effective assistance of counsel has been afforded a defendant.
The McMann Court stated that a court should not examine retrospectively the correctness
of counsel's advice, but should consider "whether that advice was within the range of com-
petence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Id. at 771. One commentator has sug-
gested that a standard of "reasonable competence" coupled with proof of "lack of prejudice"
would improve counsel's performance in criminal cases. See Note, Criminal Law - Compe-
tence, Prejudice, and the Right to "Effective" Assistance of Counsel, 60 N.C.L. Rav. 185,
192 (1981). See generally Alpert, Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Exchange Theory, 17
CiuM. L. BuLL. 381, 384-88 (1981); Schwarzer, Dealing With Incompetent Counsel-The
Trial Judge's Role, 93 HARv. L. Rv. 633, 633-41 (1980).
Although the Supreme Court has held that the sixth amendment right to effective assis-
tance of counsel applies in state proceedings by virtue of the fourteenth amendment, Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932), New York has granted this right through its own consti-
tutional and statutory provisions. People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 151, 193 N.E.2d 628,
629, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841, 842-43 (1963); see People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 328, 239 N.E.2d
537, 538-39, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663, 665 (1968); N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6; CPL § 210.15(2) (1971); cf.
People v. Blake, 35 N.Y.2d 331, 335-36, 320 N.E.2d 625, 629, 361 N.Y.S.2d 881, 887 (1974)
(right to counsel given broader scope under New York provisions than under federal consti-
tution). See generally Galie, State Constitutional Guarantees and Protection of Defen-
dant's Rights: The Case of New York, 1960-1978, 28 BuFFALo L. Rav. 157, 178-86 (1979).
Nearly 40 years ago, the Court of Appeals held that denial of a defendant's fundamental
right to effective assistance of counsel in the preparation of his case is cause for reversal.
People v. McLaughlin, 291 N.Y. 480, 483, 53 N.E.2d 356, 357 (1944). In People v. Blake, 35
N.Y.2d 331, 320 N.E.2d 625, 361 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1974), the Court described the protections
afforded to criminal defendants in the area of representation:
An accused or defendant may have the right to a lawyer generally to advise him,
represent him, or act as an attorney in his behalf. An accused or defendant may
have the right to have access to his lawyer or that his lawyer be allowed access to
him. Lastly, an accused or defendant may be entitled specially to have a lawyer to
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fendant.155 Since a defendant has the right to select counsel of his
choice, 156  however, joint representation will not pose a sixth
protect his interests before or during some particular procedure or event in the
context of the criminal proceedings in which he is enmeshed.
Id. at 338, 320 N.E.2d at 631, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 889-90.
155 See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76-77 (1941); United States v. Carri-
gan, 543 F.2d 1053, 1055 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448, 455 (2d Cir.
1973); United States v. Alberti, 470 F.2d 878, 881-82 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
965 (1973); Girgenti, Problems of Joint Representation of Defendants in a Criminal Case,
54 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 55, 55-57 (1979); Hyman, Joint Representation of Multiple Defen-
dants in a Criminal Trial: The Court's Headache, 5 HoFsTRA L. Rv. 315, 315-16 (1977).
New York has recognized that the conflicts of interest involved in joint representation may
deprive a defendant of effective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., People v. Crump, 53 N.Y.2d
824, 825, 422 N.E.2d 815, 816, 440 N.Y.S.2d 170, 171 (1981); People v. Macerola, 47 N.Y.2d
257, 264-65, 391 N.E.2d 990, 993-94, 417 N.Y.S.2d 908, 911-12 (1979).
Although one court has opined that it is futile to attempt to formulate a general stan-
dard to determine whether a conflict exists in joint representation, People v. Davis, 72 App.
Div. 2d 69, 71, 423 N.Y.S.2d 98, 101-02 (4th Dep't 1979), several Court of Appeals cases
provide illustrations. In People v. Burwell, 53 N.Y.2d 849, 422 N.E.2d 822, 440 N.Y.S.2d 177
(1981), the appellant and her husband, represented by the same attorney, were convicted of
criminal possession of stolen property. Id. at 850, 422 N.E.2d at 823, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 178.
Because there were "possible differences in the level of culpability of the two codefendants,"
the Court of Appeals reversed, stating that "it cannot be said that their joint representation
by a single attorney did not give rise to a significant potential for conflict of interest." Id. at
851, 422 N.E.2d at 823-24, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 178-79. In People v. Crump, 53 N.Y.2d 824, 422
N.E.2d 815, 440 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1981), the Court based its reversal on the possibility that if
the defendants, convicted of possession of stolen property, had had separate counsel, each
might have attempted to shift the blame to the other. Id. at 825, 422 N.E.2d at 816, 440
N.Y.S.2d at 171. Similarly, in People v. Macerola, 47 N.Y.2d 257, 391 N.E.2d 990, 417
N.Y.S.2d 908 (1979), the Court reversed an assault conviction because the attorney who
represented the defendants might have been able to establish the appellant's defense by
placing the responsibility on his codefendant. Id. at 264-65, 391 N.E.2d at 994, 440 N.Y.S.2d
at 912. In People v. LaMere, 39 App. Div. 2d 15, 331 N.Y.S.2d 178 (3d Dep't 1972), the
defendant's conviction was reversed because his attorney also represented a codefendant
whose testimony helped bring about the defendant's conviction. Id. at 16-17, 331 N.Y.S.2d
at 179-80.
Attorneys are ethically bound to recognize and avoid problems arising out of joint rep-
resentation of clients. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmIITY DR 5-105 (1979).
Before an attorney may represent multiple clients, he must explain the possible risks of
conflicts of interest, id. at EC 5-16, and must discontinue representation if one client is
likely to be affected unfavorably by that representation, id. at DR 5-105(B). Notwithstand-
ing these ethical duties, conflict problems continue to arise, particularly when an attorney
represents two defendants during plea negotiations. See Geer, Representation of Multiple
Criminal Defendants: Conflicts of Interest and the Professional Responsibilities of the De-
fense Attorney, 62 MINN. L. REv. 119, 125-27 (1978). See generally J. BOND, PLEA BARGAIN-
ING AND GUILTY PLEAS § 4.24 (1978).
1I See, e.g., Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 439 (1958); Chandler v. Fretag, 348
U.S. 3, 10 (1954); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932); People v. Arroyave, 49 N.Y.2d
264, 270, 401 N.E.2d 393, 396, 425 N.Y.S.2d 282, 285 (1980); People v. Hannigan, 7 N.Y.2d
317, 318, 165 N.E.2d 172, 173, 197 N.Y.S.2d 152, 153 (1960). Criminal defendants must be
accorded a reasonable time to obtain counsel. United States v. Bragan, 499 F.2d 1376, 1379
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amendment problem if the accused is aware of the risk of conflicts
and nevertheless permits his attorney to proceed.15 7 Hence, New
York law requires that when codefendants are jointly represented
at trial, the court must conduct an inquiry to determine whether
each defendant has made an informed decision to proceed with
this type of representation.15 Reversal of a conviction will be ap-
propriate if the trial judge fails to follow this procedure and the
defendant demonstrates that a significant possibility of conflict of
interest existed.159 Recently, in People v. Monroe,160 the Court of
(4th Cir. 1974); People v. Arroyave, 49 N.Y.2d at 270, 401 N.E.2d at 396, 425 N.Y.S.2d at
285 (citing Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. at 9-10); accord, United States v. McMann, 386
F.2d 611, 618 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 958 (1968); United States v. Bentavena,
319 F.2d 916, 936 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963).
157 People v. Gomberg, 38 N.Y.2d 307, 312-13, 342 N.E..2d 550, 553, 379 N.Y.S.2d 769,
773-74 (1975). It is well settled that joint representation is not a per se violation of the right
to effective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482 (1978);
People v. Macerola, 47 N.Y.2d 257, 262, 264, 391 N.E.2d 990, 992, 993, 417 N.Y.S.2d 908,
910, 911 (1979); People v. Gomberg, 38 N.Y.2d at 312, 342 N.E.2d at 553, 379 N.Y.S.2d at
773. One commentator has concluded that since a defendant can waive his right to counsel
completely, important constitutional questions would arise if all joint representation were
barred. See Hyman, supra note 155, at 320. Nevertheless, although it is important for courts
to avoid interfering with the attorney-client relationship, People v. Hall, 46 N.Y.2d 873, 875,
387 N.E.2d 610, 611, 414 N.Y.S.2d 678, 679, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 848 (1979), they "must
remain ever vigilant in their duty to ensure that a defendant receives effective legal repre-
sentation," People v. Macerola, 47 N.Y.2d at 262, 391 N.E.2d at 992, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 910.
" E.g., People v. Burwell, 53 N.Y.2d 849, 851, 422 N.E.2d 822, 823-24, 440 N.Y.S.2d
177, 178-79 (1981); People v. Crunmp, 53 N.Y.2d 824, 825, 422 N.E.2d 815, 816, 440 N.Y.S.2d
170, 171 (1981); People v. Fioretti, 49 N.Y.2d 976, 978, 406 N.E.2d 746, 747, 428 N.Y.S.2d
889, 889 (1980); People v. Macerola, 47 N.Y.2d 257, 264, 391 N.E.2d 990, 993, 417 N.Y.S.2d
908, 911 (1979). The leading New York case on a trial court's affirmative duty to determine
whether a jointly represented defendant has been apprised of the risks of conflicting inter-
ests is People v. Gomberg, 38 N.Y.2d 307, 342 N.E.2d 550, 379 N.Y.S.2d 769 (1975). In
Gomberg, three partners were charged with arson and were represented by a single attorney.
Id. at 310-11, 342 N.E.2d at 552, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 772. Prior to trial, the judge asked the
defendants and their attorney whether there would be any conflicts of interest, id. at 314,
342 N.E.2d at 555, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 776, and was informed that the defendants had been
apprised of potential problems in this regard, id. at 315, 342 N.E.2d at 555, 379 N.Y.S.2d at
776. One of the defendants was acquitted and the others were found guilty. Id. at 311, 342
N.E.2d at 552, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 772. On appeal, the two convicted defendants asserted that
their joint representation had denied them effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 311-12, 342
N.E.2d at 552-53, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 773. The Court of Appeals held that since the appellants
were made aware of the possibility of conflicts before trial, id. at 316, 342 N.E.2d at 555, 379
N.Y.S.2d at 777, they were precluded from raising any claim of injury from joint representa-
tion, id.
15, E.g., People v. Baffi, 49 N.Y.2d 820, 822, 404 N.E.2d 737, 738, 427 N.Y.S.2d 615, 616
(1980); People v. Macerola, 47 N.Y.2d 257, 264, 391 N.E.2d 990, 993, 417 N.Y.S.2d 908, 911
(1979). In People v. Lloyd, 51 N.Y.2d 107, 412 N.E.2d 371, 432 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1980), the
Court of Appeals defined the scope of the trial court's inquiry in joint representation cases.
The Lloyd Court held that although the trial judge must ensure that the defendants are
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Appeals held that the rules governing joint representation at trial
apply with equal force when the defendant pleads guilty pursuant
to a plea bargaining agreement." 1
In Monroe, the defendant and his codefendant were charged
with attempted murder, assault and criminal possession of a
weapon, but were permitted to plead guilty to attempted assault
pursuant to a plea bargaining agreement negotiated by their mu-
tual attorney. 162 Before accepting the plea, however, the trial court
did not determine whether the defendant was aware of the poten-
tial risks of joint representation. 163 Prior to sentencing, the defen-
dant secured separate counsel and moved to withdraw his plea, as-
serting a conflict of interest in his prior representation.' 6 After a
hearing, the court determined that the defendant had not estab-
lished a deprivation of his right to effective assistance of counsel,
and therefore denied the motion.""5 The Appellate Division, First
Department, affirmed the conviction.66
In a per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed, hold-
ing that the standards applicable to joint representation at trial
apply with equal force in plea bargaining situations. 16 7 Although
acknowledging that a defendant's right to effective assistance of
counsel is not automatically violated when his attorney also repre-
aware of the risks involved in joint representation, he is not required to explain potential
conflicts with reference to the specific case. Id. at 111, 412 N.E.2d at 373, 432 N.Y.S.2d at
687. Rather, the Court stated that trial courts may rely upon a report by defense counsel
that any conflicts have been explained fully. Id. at 111-12, 412 N.E.2d at 373-74, 432
N.Y.S.2d at 687. But cf. People v. Baffl, 49 N.Y.2d at 822, 404 N.E.2d at 738, 427 N.Y.S.2d
at 616 (although court may look to defense counsel for assurances, there remains an inde-
pendent obligation "to probe the defendants' awareness of the risks" involved in joint
representation).
" o 54 N.Y.2d 35, 429 N.E.2d 97, 444 N.Y.S.2d 578 (1981).
"I Id. at 37, 429 N.E.2d at 97, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 578.
162 Id., 429 N.E.2d at 97-98, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 578-79.
Is- Id., 429 N.E.2d at 98, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 579.
164 Id. The defendant asserted that he was told that if he pleaded guilty, his codefend-
ant would benefit from more lenient terms in the plea-bargain arrangement. Id. Moreover,
the defendant claimed that he was not counselled as to the likelihood of victory at trial if he
refused to plead guilty. Id. at 37-38, 429 N.E.2d at 98, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 579.
10- Id. at 38, 429 N.E.2d at 98, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 579. Noting that the defendant had
been "properly and fully advised" of plausible alternatives, and that he had "knowingly and
voluntarily" entered his plea, the lower court concluded that there was "no adequate show-
ing" of a deprivation of effective legal counsel. Id.
10 People v. Monroe, 73 App. Div. 2d 563 (1st Dep't 1979), afl'd, 54 N.Y.2d 35, 429
N.E.2d 97, 444 N.Y.S.2d 578 (1981).
167 54 N.Y.2d at 38, 429 N.E.2d at 98, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 579.
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sents a codefendant,"'8 the Court observed that the problems in-
herent in joint representation are as severe during plea bargaining
as they are at trial.169 Recognizing that the trial court had failed to
follow the appropriate procedure by accepting the defendant's plea
without first discerning whether he was aware of the potential
problems of joint representation, 7 0 the Court nevertheless deter-
mined that this omission did not constitute reversible error.17 ' In-
stead, the Court held that in order to obtain reversal of a convic-
tion, the defendant must show " 'a significant possibility' that a
conflict of interest existed."'7 2 Because the defendant could not
substantiate his claim regarding the existence of a conflict of inter-
est, the Court affirmed the conviction.173
In a vigorous dissent, Judges Jones, Fuchsberg and Meyer em-
phasized that every jointly represented criminal defendant must be
informed of his right to separate counsel before a conflict of inter-
est can arise.'7 4 The dissent opined that an inquiry occurring after
a defendant enters his plea presents a substantial risk of unrelia-
bility because the skill of the judge who accepted the plea and the
integrity of the attorney who represented the defendant are in is-
sue. 7 5 Thus, the dissenting judges concluded that a compulsory
1" Id. (citing People v. Macerola, 47 N.Y.2d 257, 264, 391 N.E.2d 990, 993, 417
N.Y.S.2d 908, 911 (1979)); see note 157 supra.
16- 54 N.Y.2d at 38, 429 N.E.2d at 98, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 579.
170 Id. at 39, 429 N.E.2d at 98-99, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 579-80. The Monroe Court observed
that the lower court had held a hearing before sentencing to consider the defendant's con-
tention that a conflict of interest existed. Id. The Court noted, however, that "this is not the
preferred procedure," id., 429 N.E.2d at 99, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 580, since the inquiry should
occur before the trial judge accepts the guilty plea, id. at 38, 429 N.E.2d at 98, 444 N.Y.S.2d
at 579.
171 Id. at 39, 429 N.E.2d at 99, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
1272 Id., 429 N.E.2d at 98, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 579.
173 Id., 429 N.E.2d at 99, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
174 Id. at 39-40, 429 N.E.2d at 99, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 580. (Jones, Fuchsberg and Meyer,
JJ., dissenting). The dissenting judges compared the requirement of an inquiry before entry
of the plea with the examination of a defendant who elects to proceed pro se, noting that
"both [procedures] are rooted in the key role the right to counsel plays under our adversary
system." Id. at 40, 429 N.E.2d at 99, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 580. (Jones, Fuchsberg and Meyer, JJ.,
dissenting).
176 Id. (Jones, Fuchsberg, & Meyer, JJ., dissenting). The dissenting judges observed
that:
[T]he difficulty with a retrospective hearing to determine whether there was in
fact a conflict is that it requires not only the recapture of the dynamics of the plea
bargaining.... in itself a difficult enough pursuit, but also the persuasion of the
judge who failed to see the possibility of conflict in the first place and the attorney
whose acumen, if not integrity, may be at stake, that they were in error and
should admit it.
1982]
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hearing before entry of a plea is mandatory and cannot be obviated
by a postplea inquiry designed to reveal actual conflicts of
interest.176
It is suggested that the Monroe Court properly extended to
plea bargaining cases the duty of trial courts to ensure that defen-
dants are aware of the risks inherent in joint representation. 177
Nevertheless, it seems that the Court was unjustified in concluding
that a breach of this duty mandates reversal only if a defendant
can demonstrate a significant possibility that a conflict of interest
occurred. Recent cases involving joint representation at trial indi-
cate that appellate courts rely heavily upon trial records to reveal
conflicts of interest.1 7 8 Because there is no comprehensive trial re-
cord in the plea bargaining situation, an appellate court may be
unable to state with certainty that a defendant's decision to plead
guilty was not a product of invalid considerations arising out of
joint representation.17 9 Indeed, the Supreme Court has indicated
Id. (Jones, Fuchsberg and Meyer, JJ., dissenting).
178 54 N.Y.2d at 40-41, 429 N.E.2d at 99-100, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 580-81 (Jones, Fuchsberg,
and Meyer, JJ., dissenting).
177 See note 158 and accompanying text supra. In People v. Macerola, 47 N.Y.2d 257,
391 N.E.2d 990, 417 N.Y.S.2d 90S (1979), the Court of Appeals noted that because conflict-
ing interests of codefendants often render the attorney's decision "all the more difficult,"
the reasons for imposing a duty of inquiry upon the court before trial are "obvious." Id. at
262, 391 N.E.2d at 992, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 910. Notably, the Court cited the plea bargaining
situation as an example, stating that "an attorney may be less than willing to engage fer-
vently in plea negotiations to obtain a lesser charge for one defendant if to do so would
require that defendant to testify against the other defendants." Id. In light of this state-
ment, it does not seem surprising that the Court extended the pretrial inquiry requirement
to encompass plea negotiations.
78 See, e.g., People v. Burwell, 53 N.Y.2d 849, 851, 422 N.E.2d 822, 823-24, 440
N.Y.S.2d 177, 178-79 (1981) (conviction reversed because record revealed possibility that
jointly represented defendants would be held to varying levels of responsibility); People v.
Baffi, 49 N.Y.2d 820, 822, 404 N.E.2d 737, 738, 427 N.Y.S.2d 615, 616-17 (1980) (conviction
reversed because record revealed that evidence against jointly represented defendants varied
in degree and kind); People v. Dell, 60 App. Div. 2d 18, 22-23, 400 N.Y.S.2d 236, 240 (4th
Dep't 1977) (conviction reversed because record revealed that counsel could not cross-ex-
amine client whose testimony placed codefendants at scene of crime).
Significantly, the Supreme Court has indicated that even a trial record may fail to re-
veal the harms arising from conflicts of interest. See, e.g., Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S.
475, 490-91 (1978). This inadequacy of the trial record is caused by the fact that the defen-
dant often asserts that the prejudice has occurred because the attorney refrained from a
certain course of action. Id.; accord, Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d 243, 246 (D.C. Cir.
1967); see People v. Gonzalez, 47 N.Y.2d 606, 611, 393 N.E.2d 987, 990, 419 N.Y.S.2d 913,
916 (1979).
179 Cf. People v. Grant, 45 N.Y.2d 366, 379, 380 N.E.2d 257, 264-65, 408 N.Y.S.2d 429,
436-37 (1978) (court "is rarely equipped" to determine what factors motivate a defendant's
decision to plead guilty). Client interests, economic concerns, caseload pressures and the
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that once a plea is entered, it may be "virtually impossible" for a
defendant who has pleaded guilty to demonstrate the requisite
possibility of conflict to merit reversal.1 80 Moreover, although the
Monroe majority appears to have endorsed a harmless error analy-
sis,181 the Court of Appeals previously has noted that attempts to
gauge the effects of errors are inappropriate in plea bargain cases
because of the difficulty in finding prejudice upon a review of plea
records.18 2 It is submitted, therefore, that a judge's failure to en-
sure that a defendant makes an informed decision to proceed with
joint representation before entering his guilty plea should lead to
automatic reversal.
Joan Martino
strength of the particular case are included among the considerations examined by both
defense counsel and the prosecutor in deciding whether to plea bargain. G. ROBiN, INTRO-
DUCTION TO THE CRImNAL JuSTicE SYsTEM 242, 244 (1980). Commentators have observed
that when joint representation is involved, an additional factor emerges which is detrimental
to our criminal process. These authors assert that in some cases, defense attorneys may be
inclined to bargain the rights of one client in return for benefits to another. See Alschuler,
The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1218-19 (1975); Geer,
supra note 155, at 125-27.
0 Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490-91 (1978); see Girgenti, supra note 155, at
65-67; Hyman, supra note 155, at 327.
1, See People v. Monroe, 54 N.Y.2d at 40, 429 N.E.2d at 99, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 580
(Jones, Meyer, and Fuchsberg, JJ., dissenting); cf. People v. Hodge, 53 N.Y.2d 313, 320-21,
423 N.E.2d 1060, 1064, 441 N.Y.S.2d 231, 235 (1981) (denial of effective assistance of coun-
sel before trial sometimes may be analyzed under a harmless error standard).
182 People v. Grant, 45 N.Y.2d 366, 379-80, 380 N.E.2d 257, 264-65, 408 N.Y.S.2d 429,
436-37 (1978); see, e.g., People v. Rolston, 50 N.Y.2d 1048, 1049-50, 409 N.E.2d 1375, 1376,
431 N.Y.S.2d 701, 702 (1980); People v. Harris, 48 N.Y.2d 208, 215, 397 N.E.2d 733, 736, 422
N.Y.S.2d 43, 46 (1979). In Grant, the defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of murder after
his motion to suppress a confession had been denied. 45 N.Y.2d at 371, 380 N.E.2d at 259,
408 N.Y.S.2d at 431. The appellate division held that the confession should have been sup-
pressed, but affirmed the conviction, reasoning that denial of the motion was harmless error
in view of the "overwhelming proof of the guilt of the defendant." 59 App. Div. 2d 661, 662,
398 N.Y.S.2d 279, 280 (1st Dep't 1977), rev'd, 45 N.Y.2d 366, 380 N.E.2d 257, 408 N.Y.S.2d
429 (1978). In reaching this conclusion, the court observed that even if the confession had
been suppressed and the case went to trial, the defendant would have been convicted. Id.
The Court of Appeals reversed, stating that a court cannot properly weigh the factors
usually considered in finding harmless error when a guilty plea is involved. 45 N.Y.2d at
378, 380 N.E.2d at 264, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 436. Indeed, the Court noted that absent a trial and
verdict, a court would have to rely upon mere speculation to conclude that an error was
harmless. Id. at 379, 380 N.E.2d at 436-37, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 264-65.
